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Article 4

THE EROSION OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

The following statement was prepared by
the Committee on Judicial Immunity, Judicial
Administration Division,* American Bar Association, and is reprinted here for the benefit of
the members of NAALJ.
Members are invited to
complete the questionnaire, p. 103, and return
it, with any discussion, to the Honorable
Phillip J. Roth, Committee Chairman, 536
Multnomah County Courthouse, 1021 S.W. Fourth
Avenue, Portland, OR 97204 as soon as practicable.

COMMITTEE

STATEMENT

There is a mounting concern among members of the judiciary that the
centuries old doctrine of judicial immunity no longer adequately protects
judges from personal liability for their official acts.
This concern is well
founded:
recent Supreme Court authority approves judicial exposure to
injunctive relief, strongly suggests attorney fee liability in civil rights
cases and arguably implies damages liability for wrongful executive action.
The accelerating erosion of judicial immunity is the product of the
Courts' emerging "functional" analysis of governmental immunity. This analysis
distinguishes among a judge's acts according to the governmental function being
discharged legislative, executive, or judicial and employs differing
liability principles for conduct of each kind.
Thus, judicial immunity, long
thought to apply to all acts by a judge, now applies only to those acts of a
strictly judicial nature. Cf, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 US 349 (1978) and
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumer's Union, 446 US 719 (1980).
In short, no
longer are all acts by judges "judicial acts"; rather, much of what judges do
is now considered legislative or executive action. While still immunizing
judges from money damages for wrongful judicial acts, this new and more narrow
form of judicial immunity has itself been qualified in several Circuits to
exclude protection from injunctive or declaratory relief.
Eq., Morrison v.
Ayoob; 627 F2d 669 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 US 1102 (1981); see, also,
Consumer's Union, supra, n.13, at 735. As discussed below, exposure to nonmonetary relief nonetheless may involve serious financial risk in the form of
attorney fee liability under the Civil Rights Attorney Fee Award Act of 1976
(42 USC 1988).
The most striking change wrought by the functional analysis is the
qualification of immunity for judges' executive wrongs. Consumer's Union,
supra, expressly holds judges subject to-prospective injunctive relief for
abuses of "enforcement power."
The only guidance offered by the Consumer's
Union Court as to the nature of enforcement power in the judicial setting is
to observe that the inherent and statutory power of the Virginia Court to
discipline attorneys goes "beyond that of adjudicating complaints filed by

others and beyond the normal authority of the courts to punish attorneys for
contempt."
446 US 724. The opinion fails to further define "enforcement"
or to limit its holding to the relatively unique context of professional
discipline.
Indeed, the Court impliedly expands the notion of judicial enforcement beyond disciplinary matters with its analogy to the liability of prosecutors
and law enforcement officers. 446 US 736-7.
A disturbing possibility also should be noted. Consumer's Union and
an earlier opinion by Justice White, Butz v. Economou, 438 US 478 (1978), signify
a commitment by the Supreme Court to a uniform analysis of governmental
immunity, one applicable to all governmental agents regardless of their location
in one of the three branches. Accordingly, there looms the possibility of
Under Scheuer v. Rhodes,
damages liability for a judge's executive misconduct.
416 US 232 (1974), executive officials are liable for money damages where bad
faith deprivation of civil rights are proven. Consumer's Union reveals no
principle which would restrict the qualified Scheuer immunity to members of the
executive branch. To the contrary, the analysis expounded by Consumer's Union
and Economou irresistibly leads one to expect monetary liability for functionally
similar (executive) acts.
Cf, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2690 (1980).
It is also worth noting that if the Scheuer standard is applied to the
judiciary's executive wrongs, pretrial dismissal of such actions will be
extremely difficult to obtain. Under Scheuer, the liability of an executive
official is a question of good faith and reasonable belief, a matter of subjective and objective fact.
Complaints raising factual issues regarding a
See,
defendant's state of mind are simply not susceptible to dismissal.
C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, at 493 (3rd ed. , 1976).
In addition to these new and potential forms of liability for judicial
and executive acts, an overarching exposure to attorney fees in civil rights
cases is fast developing. 42 USC 1988; the Civil Rights Attorney Fee Award
Act of 1976, authorizes fees for prevailing parties where federal constitutional
or civil rights have been vindicated. Recent federal holdings make it clear
that unsuccessful judicial defendants will be liable for fees under the Act.
Consumer's Union, supra, at 739; Ayoob, supra, at 672. Moreover, Section 1988
the amount is determined by multiplying counsel's
awards can be substantial:
normal billing rate times whatever factor the court deems appropriate.
A pervasive background issue in assessing judicial liability exposure
is the willingness of state governments to stand behind their judges with
indemnification for plaintiff recoveries and the provision of legal representation. A survey of the law in the fifty states reveals considerable variation
in the kind and degree of assistance provided.
See, Memorandum No. RIS 83.001,
In fact, only eighteen states currently
National Center for State Courts.
Id.,
provide across the board indemnification for fees, costs and recoveries.
at 2. Furthermore, the obligation of nearly all states to indemnify or represent is qualified by exclusions for 'wrongful", "deliberate'', ''malicious",
"fraudulent", or similar 'bad' acts. These legal characterizations significantly
reduce the certainty of state support by introducing considerable executive
discretion.

An additional source of judicial concern is the cost of defending
against administrative complaints. Nearly all states have judicial fitness
commissions or the like which are empowered to censure, fine, suspend or even
remove a sitting judge. Contending with these administrative actions can be
expensive and is generally not recoverable by state indemnification.
New and developing forms of exposure have generated increasing
interest among judges in a comprehensive plan of liability insurance. Adequate
coverage must respond to several judicial concerns: First, policy exclusions
for conduct alleged to be 'malicious', 'wanton', 'deliberate', etc., are
plainly undesirable. These words focus on the state of mind of the insured,
not the insured's actual conduct, and therefore create unwanted ambiguity as
to the policy's coverage.
Second, full provision must be made for the costs of defending
against both civil and administrative actions. While legal or political considerations may prohibit coverage for judgments or fines based on purposeful
wrongdoing, insurance for defense costs is clearly needed and justified.
Third, the inevitable tradeoffs between a policy's price, deductibles
and coverage limits must be resolved in favor of low deductibles regardless
of increased price or lower limits. Although personal financial protection
is of obvious concern to judges, the public's interest in an independent and
impartial judiciary also must be protected. Smaller but more frequent liabilities present a greater danger of inhibiting judicial decision-making than the
rare large award.

QUESTIONNAIRE

I.

(a) Would you favor at this time a national plan of liability insurance
coverage available to judges on a voluntary basis which would cover
damage awards arising out of one's official duties and caused by
error, omission, act, neglect or breach of duty, misstatement or
misleading statement?
(b) Additionally, should the policy cover "malicious" or "deliberate''
acts?

(a)

Yes

No

(b)

Yes

No

2.

Assuming you would favor such a plan, what other coverage do you think is
desirable? (a) Defense costs (fees, court costs, investigatory and appeal
costs)? (b) Attorney fee judgments, particularly those awarded under
42 USC 1988? (c) Private defense costs in disciplinary proceedings?
(d) Coverage for the liability of those under your supervision? (e) coverage for punitive damages?

(a)

Yes

No

(b)

Yes

No

(c)

Yes

No

(d)

Yes

(e)

Yes

3.

__

No
No

(a) Assuming further that adequate coverage can be obtained, what would
you consider a reasonable upper limit on premium costs per year?
(b) Would you favor a policy without a deductible?

(a)

$200

(b)

Yes

__

$300

__
No

$400

__

$500

__

$

